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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: IMPLIED INVALIDITY
RESULTING FROM VIOLATION OF CONFLICT OF
INTEREST STATUTE
SECTION 434 of the United States Criminal Code prescribes criminal
sanctions against a government agent or officer who is directly or in-
directly interested in the pecuniary profits or contracts of any corpora-
tion with which he transacts business for the Government.' In United
States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., the Government asserted
this conflict of interest provision in defense of an action for damages
arising out of the Government's termination of the plaintiff's power
contract with the Atomic Energy Commission. 3 The Court of Claims
found no violation of section 434 and allowed the plaintiff recovery.4
The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that a conflict of interest did exist
and that nonenforcement of the contract was necessary to vindicate the
public policy underlying the statute.
The statutory violation arose out of the conduct of Adolphe Wen-
zell, employee of a financing institution, who was retained5 by the
2 18 U.S.C. § 434 (x958). "Whoever, being an officer, agent or member of, or
directly or indirectly interested in the pecuniary profits or contracts of any corporation,
joint-stock company, or association, or of any firm or partnership, or other business
entity, is employed or acts as an officer or agent of the United States for the transaction
of business with such business entity, shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both."
This is substantially the form of the original enactment, 12 Stat. 696 (1863), which
was adopted following disclosure of fraud on the part of government agents in the
procurement of war materials during the Civil War. In the 1863 enactment, however,
the same sanctions were stated conjunctively.
Other conflict of interest provisions are found in Title 18, §§ 2oz (bribery of
government official), 216 (fraudulent procurement of government contract by officer
or Congressman), 281, 283, 284, 1914 (double compensation).
2 364. U.S. 520 (2961).
'The Government raised six defenses in the Court of Claims. The other five were:
lack of authority, lack of mutuality, failure of respondent to obtain all the necessary
regulatory approval, illegality of the financing agreements required by the contract and
failure to comply with the Atomic Eenergy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2204 (1958).
The Court found it unnecessary to consider these defenses in view of their determination
of the conflict of interest question. 364 U.S. at 525.
' 175 F. Supp. 505 (1959).
'Wenzell's first association with the Budget Bureau was in 1953 when he made a
financial analysis of the Tennessee Valley Authority. He submitted his final report in
September, and was not re-employed by the Bureau until January i8, 1954, after the
exploratory negotiations concerning the proposed project were under way. During
these periods, the consultant, Adolphe Wenzell, remained in the employ of the financing
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Budget Bureau as a part-time financial consultant during the formative
negotiations" between the AEC and plaintiff, a combine of private utility
companies. The consultant left the Government's employ prior to the
submission of the proposal which ultimately resulted in the contract.
When it later became apparent that the facilities were no longer needed,
the AEC notified the plaintiff that the Government desired rescission.
During several months of negotiation, the parties failed to reach a
satisfactory cancellation agreement; consequently, the AEC unilaterally
terminated the contract, contending that it was unenforceable. The
institution, First Boston Corporation, and continued to receive his regular salary.
Although he was not paid by the Government, he was given a sustenance allowance of
ten dollars per day plus his transportation expense. 364 U.S. at 533, 534.
' Wenzell's first official activity was on January zo, 1954. On that date, he attended
a meeting, as representative of the Budget Bureau, attended by AEC representatives and
the presidents of two public utility companies-Dixon and McAfee. There, the Govern-
ment's intention to have the facilities constructed in the Memphis area was made clear.
McAfee was discouraged over the choice of location, and s'bsequently withdrew. Dixon
agreed, at this meeting, to make a study of the cost factors of the proposed facilities,
proceeding on his own after McAfee's withdrawal.
Early in February, Dixon asked Wenzell for an estimate of what the interest rates
on the then current market would be for financing a project similar to one First Boston
had financed a few years earlier. Wenzell gave Dixon an oral estimate on February
i 4 th, and a conforming written estimate on February 2 3 d. This estimate was employed
in both of the proposals submitted by Dixon and Yates (chairman of the board of a
public utility company, who had been persuaded to join the project on February zoth).
On February 25 th, the combine submitted their first proposal. It contemplated
formation of a new corporation, Mississippi Valley Generating Co., which would finance
and construct generating facilities from which electrical power would be supplied to
the AEC through the TVA. Wenzell did not participate in the initial study of this offer.
When later apprised of its terms, he suggested that the cost estimates were too high.
Thereafter, the AEC and TVA made a more intensive analysis, the results of which
conformed to Wenzell's opinion.
While an independent study of the first proposal was being made by an official of
the Federal Power Commission, the sponsors worked on a revision of their estimate.
Wenzell's last activity as consultant to the Budget Bureau was on April 3 d, when a
meeting was held at the Bureau's offices to discuss the independent analysis and the
revised estimates. At this meeting, Wenzell confirmed the cost of money estimates he
had given Dixon earlier. The revised estimates were more acceptable to the AEC and the
sponsors were encouraged to refine their figures. 364 U.S. at 534-39.
"The AEC and TVA made an intensive joint analysis of this proposal and, having
secured the President's approval, the AEC negotiated a final agreement with the plain-
tiff. The President's authorization was based on a memorandum supplied to him by
the Director of the Budget Bureau in April. The final negotiations began in July
and ended in November, with a contract which was in a "general way" within the terms
of the second proposal. 364 U.S. at 531.
8After the contract became effective, the City of Memphis had decided to construct
municipal power facilities which would ease the TVA's commitments in that area and
leave it free to meet the AECs demands. This decision obviated the need for the con-
tracted-for facilities. 364. U.S. at 532.
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plaintiff then instituted suit in the Court of Claims for recovery of
preparatory expenses. 9
The government's consultant was found to have an indirect interest
in the contract because of the substantial possibility that his employer,
in view of its experience in the financing of similar projects,' 0 would
receive the financing sub-contract from the plaintiff. Thus, Wenzell's
culpability arose not because of any illegal relationship with the plaintiff
but because he would profit" if his employer should be chosen as financ-
ing agent.
The existence of such a conflict of interest casts doubt upon the valid-
ity of the resulting contract. The sanction of nonenforcement of con-
tracts made in violation of the statute is implicit in the act and only those
contracts that do not offend the policy objectives of the statute should
be upheld. It appears that section 434 has three basic objectives: to
insure honesty in the Government's business dealings, to insure that
government contracts are fair, and to prevent the agent or officer from
securing a private profit out of his transaction of business for the Govern-
ment.' 2 The cases relied on by the Supreme Court as precedent for the
instant decision indicate two situations where these considerations made
it necessary to invalidate government contracts.
' This amounted, according to the Court of Claim's findings, to about 1.8 million
dollars. 175 F. Supp. at 64o .
" In 1952, First Boston Corporation, Wenzell's employer, had arranged the financ-
ing of a similar contract between the AEC and a group of private utility companies in
Ohio. 364 U.S. at 555-56.
" Wenzell received, in addition to his salary as vice-president and director of First
Boston, a bonus for new business he brought into the company. 364 U.S. at 555.
The Court of Claims interpreted § 434 to require the existence of some arrangement
or commitment between First Boston Corporation and the plaintiff during Wenzell's
government employment, to the effect that First Boston would receive the financing
sub-contract if the proposal should result in a contract. x75 F. Supp. at 518. Since
no such arrangement was found to exist, it was concluded that there was no violation
of § 434. In the Supreme Court, the dissent agreed with this analysis, pointing out
that the majority's interpretation of "indirect interest" injected an element of uncer-
tainty into the statute which would make it difficult for laymen to ascertain when their
conduct was within the statute's prohibitions. 364 U.S. at 568, 569.
See generally Solow, Conflict of Interest: A Legal Nightmare, Fortune, Jan., x961,
P. 97-
" "Section 4-34 is one of several penal conflict-of-interest statutes which were de-
signed to prohibit government officials from engaging in conduct that might be inimical
to the best interests of the general public." 364 U.S. at 548. "[Ilts primary purpose is
to guarantee the integrity of the federal contracting process .... " Id. at 565.
. See generally, McElwain & Vorenberg, The Federal Conflict of Interest Statutes,
65 HA.v. L. RaV. 955, 966 (1952).
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In Rankin v. United States,13 the plaintiff as a contracting agent for
the Government, leased office space from a firm in which he was a
partner. Although the Treasury Department refused to accept the
lease, the plaintiff caused the Works Progress Administration district
office to occupy the space for over a year. The Government refused to
pay rent, and the plaintiff brought suit for a reasonable rental value.
The Court of Claims denied recovery, stating "[I]t would be strange
indeed to allow plaintiff to recover . . . when the statute makes it a
crime punishable by fine and imprisonment for him to act for the
Government and deal with himself." 4 The court concluded that since
recovery could not be based on an express contract, it could not be
founded on an implied contract.'5
Michigan Steel Box Co. v. United States,16 illustrates the second
situation. There the Superintendent of the Rural Free Delivery Service
was paid a substantial sum for securing a government contract for the
plaintiff. In a suit to recover the purchase price of mail boxes supplied
under the contract, The Court of Claims held that "no right growing
out of a contract made in violation of a penal statute will be enforced at
the insistence of a party participating in the wrong."' 7
In Rankin, the plaintiff violated the statute by acting in the dual
capacity of government agent and private contracting party.'8  In Michi-
gan Steel Box, the conflict of interest arose from the illegal "kick-back"
198 Ct. CL. 357 (1943).
"Id. at 361.
' Nonenforcement under these circumstances is consistent with the policies underlying
§ 434 It can hardly be expected that the agent will be loyal to the Government when
he is dealing with himself, and the opportunity for partiality and fraud is apparent.
Such transactions are forbidden in the law of agency and trusts. See, e.g., Raymond v.
Davies, 293 Mass. 117, 199 N.E. 321 (936) ; Taussig v. Hart, 58 N.Y. 425 (1874)5
In re Browning's Estate, 172 Misc. 647, 15 N.Y.S.2d 864 0941). See also, RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 387 (1957)5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 170,
comment /A (957).
18 49 Ct. Cl. 421 (1914). In Crocker v. United States, 240 U.S. 74 (1916) (alter-
nate ground), the same government agent arranged a similar "deal with the plaintiff.
Under the resulting contract, a number of mail satchels were delivered to the Post Office
Department. When the Government later learned of the agreement, it terminated the
contract and refused to pay for the satchels delivered. The plaintiff sued on the con-
tract and was denied recovery.
"1 49 Ct. Cl. at 440 (Emphasis added).
" 4ccord, Miller v. Ammon, 145 U.S. 421 (1892) (contract for sale of liquor in-
validated where plaintiff-vendor had no license as required by law); Bank of United
States v. Owens, 27 U.S. 526 (1829) (contract for loan of money invalidated where the
agreed-on interest exceeded the legal limit).
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agreement between the plaintiff and the government official.," Thus, in
both cases, the conduct of the party seeking relief resulted in the invali-
dation of the contract in question.
The Court of Claims opinion in the instant case distinguished the
above decisions and relied instead on the Supreme Court's decision in
Masch~any v. United States.2 °  There the War Department employed
an agent to secure options from certain landowners. The agent's com-
pensation was five per cent of the vendor's price. A number of such
options were secured, but the resulting contracts were invalidated be-
cause the prices were allegedly unfair. The Government defended the
vendor's suit to enforce one of these purchase agreements on the ground
that the contract was invalid because the agent's interest was antagonistic
to the Government's. No conflict of interest was found, however, be-
cause the plaintiff was not a private corporation or partnership in which
the agent had an interest and the intent of section 434 was to bar a
government agent "from receiving pay from a third party for assisting
that third party to secure a government contract."'" The Court held
that because no fraud was shown in this particular contract, the likeli-
hood of public disadvantage was not sufficiently menacing to warrant
nonenforcement; it is "a matter of public importance that good faith
contracts of the United States should not be lightly invalidated. ' 2   This
result underscores two significant factors: the agent's interest was ob-
viously adverse to that of the Government; the Court disregarded this
antagonism because the contract was fair and the plaintiff had presum-
ably acted in good faith. 3
The allusion in Muschany to the policy favoring enforcement of
good faith government contracts suggests a justification for the Court
"9 In agency law, such a secret agreement, concomitant the contract between the
third party and the principal, raises a presumption of unfairness. The principal, in
this situation, has alternate remedies. He can either rescind the contract or affirm it and
recover the secret profit from the agent, regardless of whether the principal suffered a
loss. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY, §§ 312, 313, comment i (x957). See also
4. U.S.C. 31 (1958).
20 324. U.S. 49 (1945).
21 Id. at 67.
22 Id. at 66.
2
' In the Mississippi Valley Generatling Co. case, the Chief Justice said, "Muschany
did not involve a contract which resulted from an illegal transaction [because no con-
flict of interest was found], and it is consequently understandable that the contract there
in question was enforced." 364. U.S. at 564. However, in Muschany, both the agent
and the vendor were interested in securing as high a purchase price as possible. There-
fore, even if this particular agent acted in good faith, the danger of dishonesty and
unfairness seems as great, if not greater, than in the instant case.
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of Claim's holding in the instant case. The representatives of the plain-
tiff were not guilty of culpable conduct, inasmuch as they did not have
any "kick-back" arrangement with Wenzell nor was he in any sense
their agent. To the contrary, Wenzell's interest arose out of the pos-
sibility that his employer would be asked to arrange the financing of
the contract. Moreover, the Government conceded that the final con-
tract was fair.
The Supreme Court disregarded these factors, however, stating that
the policy expressed in section 434 "leaves no room for equitable con-
siderations.1 24  It is true that nonenforcement insures that the govern-
ment agent does not achieve an unfair advantage. Yet, the private
contracting party suffers a severe economic loss, even though he is free
from fault and the contract is fair. In declaring the contract unen-
forceable, the Court seems to have overlooked the countervailing policy,
expressed in Muschany, of enforcing good faith government contracts.
The Court, instead, stated that the public must be protected from the
corruption "which might lie undetectable beneath the surface" of a con-
tract "tainted" by a conflict of interest. 25  But since an extensive joint
analysis of the plaintiff's proposal was made by the AEC and TVA after
Wenzell was no longer associated with the Budget Bureau, this propo-
sition seems inappropriate to the case.
In view of the conceded fairness of the contract, it is pertinent to
inquire what alternate remedies were available to the Government.
The most obvious would be criminal prosecution of the consultant under
section 4-34. Also, since the consultant violated his fiduciary duty, a civil
action could be brought to recover any profit accruing to him. This
remedy is available even though the Government suffers no pecuniary
loss from the transaction.20
Although nonenforcement in the instant case averts the evils section
434 was designed to guard against, it does so at the expense of the
policy favoring enforcement of good faith government contracts The
adoption of a blanket rule of nonenforcement in all cases was not re-
24 364 U.S. at 565. This statement was taken from the dissenting opinion of Judge
Jones in the Court of Claims. 175 F. Supp. at 533.
"364. U.S. at 565.
28 "If an agent receives anything as a result of his violation of a duty of loyalty to
his principal, he is subject to a liability to deliver it, its value, or its proceeds, to the
principal." REsTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 403 (I957). Cf., MacIsaac v. Pozzo,
8i Cal. App. zd z78, 183 P.zd 9io (194.7)5 Walsh v. Atlantic Research Associates,
Inc-, 32i Mass. 57, 7z N.E.zd 58o (i9,-7) 5 Hey v. Cummer, 89 Ohio App. 104, 97
N.E.zd 702 (1950).
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quired by congressional mandate27 and policy considerations do not
compel it. Where the contract is fair and the party seeking to enforce
it did not participate in the wrong, the more reasonable course would
seem to limit the Government's remedy to action against the offending
party.
27 Congress has never expressly provided for invalidation of government contracts
where the government contracting agent has violated § 434 or its predecessors. How-
ever, in i8 U.S.C. § 216, the President is expressly authorized to invalidate government
contracts secured for any person by a Congressman who receives in return a pecuniary
benefit. Section 2i6 also provides criminal sanctions for both parties to such an agree-
ment.
